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manslaughter in the first degree as ". . . an act creating such extreme
risk of death as to manifest a wanton indifference to the value of
human life according to the standard of conduct of a reasonable man
under the circumstances . ". ..,5
The opinion in the principal case shows that the court considered
the defendant's acts as falling under the heading of the old negligent
voluntary manslaughter. This is difficult to understand. It is hard
to see how the acts of hitting, beating, kicking, and stomping another
person can be considered negligent. It was not treated as negligence
in the Maulding case; There it was considered willful murder.
This writer has been unable to find any case which treated these
elements as belonging in the negligence field. While the purpose of
this statute must be commended, it is suggested that this case does
not fit within the class of negligence, and thus does not call for any
consideration of the statute.
There is one further point of interest in this case. The court
defined the word "wanton" as it is to be used in the first degree of KRS
435.022.
A wanton act is a dangerous act, done on purpose, in complete disregard
of the rights of others. The actor must have conscious knowledge of the
probable consequences and a complete disregard for them.16
It is suggested that this definition is not adequate to allow a jury
to distinguish between the crimes of willful murder and involuntary
manslaughter. Any intentional homicide would be a wanton act,
under this definition. The jury could very easily find a person guilty
of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree when he has deliber-
ately shot another in the head and killed him. This would result in
what we could call the "intentional involuntary manslaughter" rule to
take the place of the negligent voluntary manslaughter. Then we
would need another statute to do away with this equally impossible
crime. Then a case interpreting... AD infinitum.
Vernon G. Lewter
CONSTrITTONAL LAw-DUE PRocEss-AicnSSION To PRACrICE-HEAiR-
INGS BEFORE COMIM=TEES ON CHARAcrER AND FrrNms.-In 1936 the
New York State Board of Bar Examiners certified that petitioner had
passed the state's bar examinations. In 1938, after several hearings,
the state's Committee on Character and Fitness refused to certify that
15 KRS 435.022(1).
16 Lambert v. Commonwealth, 377 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
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petitioner possessed the general fitness required for an attorney-at-law.
The Appellate Division thereupon denied petitioner admission to the
bar. Petitioner, in 1948, asked the Appellate Division to direct the
committee to review its earlier determination. This request was denied.
In 1948 the Appellate Division permitted him to file a new application,
but the committee in 1950 again refused to certify him. In 1951
petitioner's request that the committee be directed to furnish him
with statements explaining why it refused to certify him was denied.
In 1954 the Appellate Division denied petitioner's request to fie a new
application for admission. The Court of Appeals refused leave to
appeal; the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Petitioner
filed a fifth application with the Appellate Division in 1960 which
was denied. Petitioner's present petition to file an application for
admission was denied by the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals
affirming. The Court of Appeals, at petitioner's request, held ex-
pressly that petitioner was not denied due process of law in violation
of his constitutional rights. Held: Reversed. Petitioner was denied
procedural due process when he was denied admission to the bar
without a hearing on the charges filed against him before either the
conmittee or the Appellate Division. Willner v. Committe on Char-
acter and Fitness, 373 U.S. 9W-(1968).
In the past the Court' had concerned itself with the grounds upon
which a state could base a denial of admission to the bar. In the
principal case the Court was concerned "only with what procedural
due process requires if the license is to be withheld. 2
The Court had not considered such a problem before. However,
it had reached a similar conclusion in cases where a person was
about to be deprived of his livelihood on the basis of another's testi-
mony. In one case it was held that the government could not dis-
charge an employee of a government contractor in a proceeding in
which he was not afforded the safeguards of confrontation and cross-
examination.3 An earlier case held that the application of an attorney
to practice before the United States Board of Tax Appeals could not
be rejected on charges of unfitness without a hearing.4
A few state courts have passed upon the problem which the prin-
cipal case raises. The Arizona court held that where an applicant for
admission to the bar produced evidence of his good character, he
could not be excluded from practice solely upon secret reports not
I See In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) and Schware v. Board of Bar
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
2,37.3 U.S. at 103.
3 Greene v. MeElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
4 Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
196,41
KENTucKY LAw ouRNAL[
revealed to him.5 The court said: "If they [the informers] insist on
hiding behind a cloak of secrecy, then their evidence cannot be used
to impeach the character of a man whose only apparent fault has been
to acquire a few devious secret enemies."" Although the Arizona court
does not so hold, one might conclude that a hearing would be required
if the evidence against the applicant were to be used against him.
The Oregon court went further when it held that in bar admission
proceedings " . . the applicant is entitled to confront the witnesses,
to subject them to cross-examination, and to invoke the protection of
the tried, wise, and well-settled rules of evidence."7 Presumably this
would require a hearing for the applicant. A similar result has been
reached in Louisiana.8
To require a hearing for an applicant to the bar before he is denied
admission is in the best interests of all concerned. Although the
principal case was decided under the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution, the requirement
of a hearing finds expression in the sixth amendment. The framers of
the Constitution wished to guarantee to every citizen in a criminal
proceeding the right to a trial where he could confront his accusers
and present his own evidence. The same should be true for one who
is about to be denied admission to the bar:
Thus far the Court has considered admission to the bar,0 permis-
sion to practice before a government board' ° and government employ-
ment" as privileges which require a hearing before they can be
denied. It is likely that such a requirement will in the future be
extended to other areas of employment.
Situation in Kentucky
The Kentucky Revised Statutes provide that the Court of Appeals
may make such rules as it deems necessary regulating the admission
of persons to practice law in Kentucky, such as regulating qualifica-
tions, application and license fees, and examinations.' 2 However,
there are no statutory provisions made for an applicant who is-denied
admission for lack of good moral character to request a hearing. Nor
are there cases which shed any light on the matter.
James A. Kegley
5 Application.of Burke, 351 P.2d 169 (Ariz. 1960).6 Id. at 172.7 In re Crum, 204 P. 948, 949 (Ore. 1922).
8 Moity v. Louisiana State Bar Association, 121 So. 2d 87 (La. 1960).
9 Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).10 Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
"1 Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
12 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 30.030 (1963).
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